IslamOnline - Iraq... The Aftermath

The continuing violence in Iraq has cast doubt on whether Washington’s “Iraqification” strategy can ever be successful. This strategy, modeled after the failed “Vietnamization” strategy of the 1960s and 1970s, calls for training indigenous Iraqi military and security forces in order to have them replace US forces in carrying out essential security roles. The intent is for Iraqis to, eventually, fight Iraqis in the interests of the US government. The primary goals are to reduce the losses to US troops while at the same time adding credibility to US efforts in the country since it will limit the perception that Iraq is under foreign occupation.

Even at the initiation of this strategy, it was clear that it would be difficult to achieve. As shown during Washington’s attempts at this policy in Vietnam, the type of individual who is willing to fight his own population in the interests of a foreign power is often corrupt and fails to make an effective fighter. The overall success of this policy relies on the ability of the foreign power to marginalize guerrilla forces and prevent them from gaining support from the civilian population. Washington was unable to do this during the conflict in Vietnam and, judging by recent events in Iraq, has failed here, too.

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The latest violence in Fallujah and in Iraq’s Shiite cities highlights this failure of policy. During Moqtada Al-Sadr’s rebellion, vehicles and equipment that were supplied by Washington to the new Iraqi security forces were seen driven by guerrilla forces loyal to Al-Sadr. Similar to the way the National Liberation Front used stolen US-supplied equipment originally given to the South Vietnamese Army, Al-Sadr’s guerrillas equipped themselves with modern military supplies stolen from the United States. In addition, members of Iraq’s US-trained security forces were seen in a fighting role in Al-Sadr’s force; as one lieutenant of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps told the New York Times, “We may work for the government now. But if anything happens, we all work for [Moqtada] Sadr.”

As for the soldiers who refrained from joining the guerrillas, the majority were unwilling to fight their Iraqi brethren; indeed, at the start of violence in Fallujah and in Iraq’s southern cities, guerrillas had absolutely no difficulties taking over checkpoints and posts manned by Iraq’s security forces. These US-funded fighters simply gave up their arms and fled, unwilling to risk their lives for US objectives in the country.

These weaknesses caused a serious dilemma for Washington policymakers since it overtaxed their own forces, which suddenly had to fill the vacuum created by fleeing Iraqi soldiers. At one point, US commanders attempted to send an entire battalion of their newly-trained Iraqi forces into Fallujah. The 620-man battalion, while en route to the city, suddenly refused to fight; as US Army Major General Paul Eaton told the Washington Post, the common theme of the battalion was that “We did not sign up to fight Iraqis.” Eaton continued, “The lines are blurring for a lot of Iraqis right now, and we’re having problems with a lot of security functions right now.”

The implications involved in the failure of Washington’s Iraqification policy cannot be underestimated. If the United States is unable to recruit Iraqis to carry out essential security functions that involve fighting guerrillas whose objectives are to eject the United States from Iraq, then Washington’s involvement in the country will be unsustainable. The United States does not have the manpower, funds and domestic political support to remain embroiled in heavy guerrilla warfare for years to come.

The importance of the Iraqification strategy can be seen by recent statements made by US military spokesman Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt. In order for the United States to achieve its interests in Iraq, the country will have to “have Iraqi police governing [Fallujah], Iraqi government officials making decisions for [Fallujah], Iraqi civil defense marching up and down [Fallujah].” Kimmitt’s point was that stability in Iraq hinges on the ability of the United States to create indigenous military forces capable of keeping order in all of Iraq, especially its most troublesome cities, such as Fallujah.

If consistent attacks against US troops continue, Washington will be forced to make some serious compromises in its Iraq strategy. Failure to create an efficient Iraqi security force willing to battle anti-US guerrillas will mean that Washington will have to negotiate with leaders that it does not want to negotiate with, such as Shi’te leader Moqtada Al-Sadr.

Nevertheless, negotiation may not be enough since it is much easier for Iraqi guerrillas to prolong the violence than it is for Washington. As in the case of the Vietnam conflict, foreign powers entangled in a guerrilla conflict will only be able to sustain troop losses for so long before the pressure to pull troops out of the conflict becomes too extreme. If Washington’s attempts to pit US-trained Iraqis against Iraqi guerrillas continue to fail, then it will only be a matter of time until compromises on Iraq’s political future will be made.